In August 2021, the Venezuelan opposition under the Democratic Unitary Platform began negotiations with the government of Nicolás Maduro in Mexico. At that time, there was widespread skepticism regarding the reach of the novel process, which ended up proving right: the dialogue came to a halt and was later suspended for 13 months. The negotiations resumed on November 26 and a partial agreement that had been cooked up for several months was finally signed, stirring divergent reactions from those who see an opportunity for progress and those who wonder whether there are reasons to be optimistic.

The Unitary Platform and the government signed an agreement that allows the progressive release of more than 3 billion dollars belonging to the Venezuelan State that have been frozen in the international financial system. The funds are intended to be used to address social issues in Venezuela. In return for the restart of negotiations, the United States Department of the Treasury issued a license allowing oil company Chevron to trade Venezuelan crude in the United States.

In light of this, one wonders about the reasons that led to the signing of the agreement at the beginning of this new round of negotiations in Mexico. How bad is the situation of the Maduro government to make it accept the controlled release of funds? How big is the need of the United States for Venezuelan oil and gas amid the shortages caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine? And how weak is the opposition represented in the Unitary Platform to sign an agreement in exchange for the sole promise of advancing the political agenda?

A year ago I was among the people moderately optimistic about these negotiations. I thought that we had to join efforts so that the process would yield results that reduce the cost that Venezuelan people have paid —even with their lives— for the complex humanitarian emergency that afflicts the country. Today I see no indications to think that the talks could lead to a real commitment between both parties to advance the reinstitutionalization of the country.

According to the estimates of the UN humanitarian response plan 2022, seven million people (25% of the population) have some type of unmet basic need in Venezuela. In October, the agency reported having provided assistance to 2.2 million people.

The cases of dire needs are painful. For example, in August 2021, 12 children died in wait for a kidney transplant at the J.M. de Los Ríos Hospital in Caracas. Between January and October 2022, 10 more children and teenagers died in that same hospital. The deaths were a consequence of their pathologies and, above all, the lack of a health system that offers them greater possibilities and alleviates their suffering. However, not only children are in a situation of vulnerability, the situation of the public health system threatens every Venezuelan.

For this reason, some deem it positive that the restart of the dialogue began with humanitarian matters. According to a statement by Jorge Rodríguez, president of the National Assembly and the leading spokesman for the negotiators of the Maduro government, the funds to be released amount to more than 3 billion dollars and will be used for public health, education, electricity and others.

However, the release of the money is not as easy as it seems given that it will be administered by a United Nations fund. And details are still lacking on the implementation and the mechanisms of accountability to guarantee transparency in its management.

One thing that did unfold quickly was the license granted by the US Department of the Treasury to Chevron. The decision has been criticized from all sides of the opposition, Chavismo and even some factors in the political center. On the one hand, they consider that this easing of sanctions, with nothing in return from the Maduro government, reflects the weakness of the Unitary Platform; On the other, radical Chavismo believes that the move is an act of imperialist control over Venezuelan oil. In the center, the doubts have to do with the limits of the license, which does not authorize the payment of royalties or taxes to the Venezuelan State by Chevron, although this is somewhat misleading.

In the end, however well-intentioned it may be made to appear, the agreement means the tutelage of foreign factors over Venezuelan assets (a fund administered by the UN, limitations on oil production), which threatens the interests of the nation.

In August of last year, when negotiations were still taking place in Mexico, a memorandum of understanding was reached contemplating an agenda with seven key aspects, including electoral guarantees and the respect for political rights, the lifting of sanctions on the Maduro government and reparations for the victims of violence.

The agenda was broad enough for allowing the approval of partial agreements and, at the end of the talks, the establishment of a roadmap focused on the essential issues of the search for a return to democracy in the country and a dignified life for the people.

Time proved the skeptics of the dialogue right. Barely two months later, Maduro’s delegation left the table after the extradition of businessman Álex Saab to the United States and maintained its line of persecution of dissent. The opposition, represented by the Unitary Platform, capsized along with the idea of an interim government headed by Juan Guaidó. In the months that have passed since then, more Venezuelan children and adults have died due to unmet basic needs, while both parties failed to advance even in the humanitarian aspect that they now hold up as a great achievement.

Today I am also skeptical, and the reason for my distrust has to do with how this partial agreement was reached and, especially, the fact that both groups, even giving them the benefit of the doubt, have come to a moment when their survival depends on one another and have decided to act accordingly, regardless of the consequences for Venezuelan society.

Both agree in assuming that they represent the Venezuelan people rather than the partial interests of each side. It seems that they only sit down to negotiate to maintain their current state of affairs. Should they continue along those lines, they will at most reach a pact of coexistence that allows them to sell the illusion that things will be different this time.

Despite my pessimism, I hope both sides can find an approach truly centered on the people. One way is by making use of participatory mechanisms that allow the incorporation of other voices such as civil society groups and human rights defenders. Also by establishing guarantees of accountability of the resources that will be allocated, promoting transparency in the discussions, and generating common spaces that reduce the degree of mistrust that currently gravitates over the negotiation process. But, above all, I hope that no more Venezuelans continue to die due to the inability of two groups that in the end are only fighting for power.

Translated by José Rafael Medina