Political scientist John Magdaleno begins with a premise that he considers fundamental to interpret the new configuration of the Electoral Power: No elections are entirely free or competitive under hegemonic authoritarianism.
“Calling the regime a dictatorship and waiting for all the democratic guarantees at the same time is a contradiction; this is the first thing that must be assimilated to scale down the expectations,” he warns.
In his opinion, the new National Electoral Council (CNE), with a board composed of two rectors from the opposition and three from the ruling party, “is the best possible in the context of hegemonic authoritarianism.”
“It is a good and significant first step, but just the first step in a process that has many complexities in the path to restoring constitutional guarantees,” he says.
The magister in political science highlights two more premises in his analysis: the government of Nicolás Maduro knows that it lost the electoral majority and will continue to induce strategic dilemmas in the opposition to reduce the uncertainty of the elections or, in other words, to avoid losing spaces of political power.
The third premise has to do with the external pressures to which Magdaleno attributes the political agreement that was reached on the new electoral authorities: “What is happening may be the result of a set of external pressures on the State: the course of the investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC), the latest reports from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the economic impact of the sanctions”.
How can the new rectors recover confidence in the vote? What are the priority tasks that they must assume?
Confidence in the vote depends not only on the work of the rectors but on the conduct exhibited by the contenders and the government in particular. However, there are decisions regarding technical issues that the CNE can take to improve confidence: No more migrations of voters to different voting centers, the permanent opening of the Electoral Registry, and the possibility of voting from abroad. These would be good signs, but it is very important to measure the context in which we find ourselves. The appointment of a new board is a step forward, but we cannot expect that a CNE with a majority of members akin to the government will reverse years of violations under the current institutional context.
How can the new CNE encourage the other public powers to cooperate? For example, returning the use of political emblems to the legitimate opposition leaders depends on the Supreme Tribunal…
This does not depend on a decision by the CNE. If the CNE decided to restore the rights of these political organizations it would probably face a conflict with other Powers. The institutional context does not make the matter easy.
Why did the ruling party compromise on the appointment of a new CNE? What incentives can you identify?
This is a combination of incentives and pressure. I have already listed the pressures: the investigation at the ICC, the reports on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, the economic and financial impact of the sanctions on the state’s revenue. It seems that the Government is realizing that without the easing of trade, oil, and financial sanctions, it is difficult for the economy to restart. There is also domestic pressure in the form of sectors of the dominant coalition pressing for a sort of political détente.
The incentive is that the changes are taking place in the face of regional elections where the presidency is not at stake. What is at stake is the distribution of state and city public power. It seems that every time we approach a presidential election or the possibility for a recall referendum, the risks increase.
Another incentive is the possibility to further divide the opposition. This strategy of encouraging some sectors to take part in an election goes against the decision of the official opposition, the one with international recognition. One way to inflict damage to the strategy of Juan Guaidó and his team is to appoint a more acceptable CNE.
Can this new CNE be a trigger for a political transition to democracy?
I don’t think so. It would be asking a lot from this CNE. Transitions are the result of a chain of more complex events. They also imply more organization from the opposition. The debate has always revolved around electoral conditions, often forgetting the conditions that depend on the opposition. The opposition must work seriously on the organization of the social fabric and political and electoral mobilization. The opposition must also reflect on strategic initiatives to overcome the obstacles presented to it.
This is not yet a liberalization because I understand that the guarantees must be restored first. In this sense, how can we call this new CNE? Is it an opening up?
It is the first step. Let’s not make things complicated. Liberalization involves a much more comprehensive restitution of guarantees, the political right to participate must be restored. I am very concerned that there is no notion of reality: some people call the regime a dictatorship but they ask for free and competitive elections at the same time. That is not going to happen. What may happen is that, through the combination of internal and external pressures and incentives, a political detente may open the door to liberalization, but the process is complex.
What is the role of the international community? We see the OAS ignoring the appointments and, on the other hand, the Spanish government welcoming them.
I observe a contradiction within the international community. Some actors have a clear notion of a transition as a process rather than an event that only needs a trigger, while others, pressured by desire and even good faith, think that a transition is going to happen in an accelerated and immediate way. Some have a greater notion of realism about the process than others and disagree on the modalities to address the Venezuelan case.
What seems more appropriate to me is understanding that any positive sign that may lead to the restitution of rights must be accompanied. If the external factors say it is not enough every time a positive sign comes out, that is fine, but how will they contribute to the restoration of the rest of the guarantees?
You have indicated that the opposition should evaluate the use of elections to increase political conflict. Why is it important for the opposition to recover spaces in the CNE under an authoritarian context?
Because other strategic options have not worked: a coup, a foreign military intervention. The second is that the electoral issue, electoral participation, has not been framed as a tool to stimulate a transition towards democracy.
Until 2017, the opposition went to elections in the hope that the result would be respected, but the participation was not part of a mobilization strategy to raise the costs to the authoritarian regime. There is a big difference, the approach is radically different between using an election to accumulate power and using it to cause relevant threats to the authoritarian regime. There has not been a strategy for the latter.
The third thing is that the essential source of power available to the opposition is the discontent of the people over the economic performance of the government, the poor executions of its policies, the permanent violation of guarantees, its undemocratic nature, and the enormous deterioration of the country. The discontent, which is the main source of potential power for the opposition, must be organized, articulated, coordinated, and channeled, and the only ways I know to channel it are protests and elections. In my opinion, these two channels should be stimulated simultaneously. The point is to understand the objective behind taking part in an election.
Translated by José Rafael Medina
