It will be necessary to pay redoubled attention to the new realities and expectations, and to facilitate ways to make small or great advances possible, instead of filling the road with mines
The discussion on the relevance of international sanctions and their uncertain contributions in favor of the democratization of countries gripped by authoritarianism once again occupies our attention. Knowing that the battered opposition to these regimes could benefit from a suitable, effective diplomatic pressure, sometimes the results of such policies end up creating discomfort, especially when, far from solving problems, they seem to add unexpected obstacles to the path of political change.
The cases of Cuba, North Korea, Syria, Libya or Iran are emblematic. Contrary to what one may expect, these are regimes that, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the US, the EU and the UN, display anti-fragility, maintain high levels of repression and do not show signs of political liberalization. The same is true of Belarus, where Lukashenko, surrounded by the EU, continues to threaten to “break the neck” of the destabilizers. The creation and invigoration of cooperation networks between authoritarian governments also appear as another undesired effect of the sanctions policy.
Academic research abounds in relevant findings in this regard. Wood (2008), Peksen and Drury (2010) observe that authoritarian countries become less democratic when they are subjected to sanctions. And, in response to them, governments invariably choose to intensify the repression and co-optation of dissent.
Given these findings and the aforementioned restriction of the diplomatic menu, we insist on considering other approaches. Faced with the need to seek a “virtuous” side to these policies of intervention in foreign political processes, “smart”, selective sanctions tend to be regarded as the best alternative to dramatic sectoral sanctions, for example. Some authors, such as Eric Farnsworth, indicate that these policies could render some positive outcomes if used as a means to achieve specific reforms and attainable objectives rather than an end in themselves or a strategy to force a rupture -the exact opposite of Trump’s “maximum pressure” plan for Venezuela-.
In the Venezuelan case, however, nothing indicates so far that the bad reputation of the sanctions can be averted. There is also no indication that these operations have regrouped and strengthened the anemic democratic forces, increasingly unfit to make demands. Or that they have optimized the efforts of the OAS, the United States, the EU, the Lima Group, the International Contact Group, the UN or the Vatican to prevent the Maduro government from clinging to power.
Without considering the potential – not yet evident – of the democratizing incentive associated with sanctions, it is worth recalling again some experiences that attest to this elusive, almost ungraspable virtuous intervention that could guide, by the way, that good desire that clumsily roams around here. This is the case of Central America in the 1980s when Contadora’s efforts in favor of conflict resolution stood out in a region ravaged by violence.
In times marked by the tensions of the Cold War, the first thing was to separate the wheat from the chaff. Preconceptions about the approach to conflicts like the Nicaraguan civil war (seen by the US as a mere local expansion of the East-West conflict) were put aside. The attempt to recognize the identity, positions and interests of the parties involved and intercept the escalation thanks to a mediation that did not strip the internal actors of prominence, was crucial. It was also important to understand the need to impact the prevailing socio-economic conditions that only fostered chaotic exodus and refugee flows. More possibilism and less epic, in short. A respectful approach that contributed to reducing defensive attitudes, weakened an agonizing relationship and smoothed out obstacles that previously annulled the reach of other initiatives.
The negotiations entrusted by the UN to Latin American countries (and which did not exclude the cooperation of other states) were a diplomatic innovation at the time. In 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela reached an agreement on the need to explore “possible new actions” compatible with the principle of non-interference, and to eliminate “external factors” that aggravated the situation in the region.
Multilateralism was wielded with tenacity, empathy and prudence. The mechanism laid the foundations for peace and democratization that reached their final stage in the Esquipulas Agreement; it influenced the moderation of hard-line positions such as that of Ortega in Nicaragua or in the containment of the aggressive intervention policy that the North American government deployed with its support to the “Contra”.
The concern that moved the creators of the Contadora group can be connected to this suspicion that foreign aid, awkwardly and untimely administered, would aggravate the political ailments that it seeks to remedy. And that, by contrast, an approach aimed at avoiding the entrenchment of the anti-democratic factions and weakening their influence would be more useful in undoing the tight knot of the Venezuelan crisis.
Ideally, the internal action could provide a working ground for allies. Instead of yielding to the external locus of control, the opposition could commit to identifying the method that guarantees and promotes the desired accumulation of forces and the rehabilitation of the lost autonomy. That will not be achieved if the abstentionist temptation resurfaces to stir up renewed impulses. So, if one wants to help Venezuela, phronesis will be necessary, that practical wisdom to bring together all the actors. It will be necessary to pay redoubled attention to the new realities and expectations, and to facilitate ways to make small or great advances possible, instead of filling the road with mines.
Translated by José Rafael Medina
