Once again, we hear of negotiations between the government and the opposition. Some signs point to ongoing conversations or at least that the conditions are being set for the talks. They are happening now because the interests of each group benefit the general interest in the sense that it opens the possibility of giving a direction to the political conflict. The government needs an administration. The opposition needs to preserve itself as an alternative. Between these two interests, an area is opened to negotiate. The risk is in the opposition’s court. Under an authoritarian form of government, the participation of the opposition can normalize the status quo. But if it does not participate, it will also normalize it and will become a nominal opposition. The challenge for the opposition is twofold: participating under the rules of the game of the authoritarian system to build political strength while becoming an alternative for society
The climate for possible political negotiations between the government and the opposition is back. Although there were signs of talks that resulted in events such as the designation of a new Electoral Council that is generally well regarded, the most striking outcome was the U-turn made by Guaidó and his team with the recognition of conversations with representatives of the Government, as stated by Freddy Guevara. A rapprochement that Maduro confirmed on May 11. Why are we seeing these conversations now along with very specific gestures such as the Covax issue, the agreement with the UN World Food Programme, the transfer of the 6 citgo executives, and the designation of a new Electoral Council with two rectors promoted by civil society? What is the difference now?
Perhaps the atmosphere for negotiations returned because it was about time. The Venezuelan political conflict is at a standstill. This situation led to a sort of stable inertia. Life went on without a definitive political outcome. The country can be in this situation for years and decades, as is the case in other nations with unresolved conflicts. Life goes on. People adapt, even if they despise “the regime.” And they adapt faster in the context of dollarization.
This is not yet the case in Venezuela. The difference possibly lies in our previous political experience, in which we enjoyed a high standard of living. Perhaps it is in our collective unconsciousness, and society knows that it cannot – and should not – return to an impossible past but it can leave a mediocre present of grim lives. The brakes were hit, a sense of survival that led us to stop the free fall into the void. Tired of the conflict and perhaps aware that they are at a dead point, some elites helped this happen. Or more than morals, some elites with the resources to thrive in a status quo that is harmful to the majority but beneficial for them may have seen the need to talk to preserve their position.
The difference in not reaching the bottom of the abyss is made by the ordinary citizen who often bears the heaviest of the conflict and decides to distance himself from the political class and lead a hard life instead of being used by the elites that promote the conflict but are always protected and never have – nor will have – problems. People realized that they cannot change the reality of the country but they no longer want to be the fool who always bears the burdens of inter-elite struggles.
Another variable that favored political negotiations between the government and the opposition are the changes taking place in the hemisphere. The international environment of 2019 is very different from that of 2021: it is less prone to forceful measures against Maduro because they did not work and, most importantly, the coronavirus catalyzed social processes that are now transformed into political changes. The most recent of them, the protests in Colombia and the turn to the left and independents in recent elections in Chile. Even the candidate of the alliance that included the Communist Party of Chile managed to win the city Government of the metropolitan region of Santiago.
Finally, the change experienced by the US that now seeks to position itself as a reliable world leader includes a less interventionist profile in comparison to the previous administration, at least regarding its relation with Venezuela. The US is advancing in a logic of recognizing government gestures that in turn encourage new gestures of opening up.
II
The government’s reason to accept possible negotiations with the opposition is its wish to stay in power. It realized that it had to “get serious” once the opposition ceased to be a threat to power and Trump lost the 2020 elections.
The government knows that the existential political struggle is either coming to an end or permeating into the government institutions, instead of a subversive phase to oust Maduro. In other words, there are no longer any threats or the existing ones have weakened. Maduro may be more confident that he will complete his term in January 2025 without the threats he faced from 2014 to 2020. Maduro won the battle for power, but he is losing the war of running a country. He is aware of this and that is why he agrees to go to negotiations with the opposition under his conditions, which are not the conditions of a defeated politician but rather those of someone who wants to have the stability to govern, which can be seen in the different bills under discussion at the National Assembly, the outline of the legal structure of the Chavista political system, Maduro version.
In plain words, if Maduro aspires to stay in power, he has to have a functional government, not some “thugs” who do business in public companies as if they were their own preserve. If the problem is corruption, let it be like in China, where corruption is part of the system, rather than the “thuggish corruption” of public companies Lácteos Los Andes or PDVSA, to mention just two cases. That is to say, authoritarianism has to be competent and effective to some degree, and it cannot be mediocre or incompetent in terms of management as it is now.
The opposition’s reason to engage in negotiations is staying in the political arena, instead of disappearing or remaining on the sidelines, as it decided to do. The opposition risks repeating the story of Juan Vicent Gómez’s rivals after the death of the ruler. The traditional opposition to Gómez thought that the death of the General would reinstate them in power, but they did not count on the evolution of society, and the Venezuela of December 1935 was very different from the Venezuela of 1908: new generations –the best known the 1928 Generation – and new social movements such as unions in an oil, post-agricultural economy. The political reality of 1936 filled the void left by Gómez, instead of his former adversaries who felt ready to take charge.
Something similar happens in Venezuela in 2021. We still don’t know whether there will be a new 1928 Generation or not, but a whole generation has passed and others have completed their cycle since Chávez won the elections in 1998. Someone aged 50 in 1998 is a 70-year-old man today. Someone who was 20 has now reached 40 years of age.
The four largest parties in the opposition adopted the static strategy of waiting for a “breakdown” that has not happened in the last 7 years. 7 more years may go by without a breakdown, the country in ruins, and a sidelined opposition that would risk disappearing or being displaced by new political actors, promoted by the government or by their own. The opposition realized that Venezuela is not going to stop just because it is not in power or its demands are not met. It learned a life lesson: no one is indispensable in politics. If the biggest parties in the opposition do not wish to participate, that’s their right, but another opposition will arise, better, the same, or worse – we do not know – and today’s opposition will be swallowed up by the evolution of society, just like General Gómez’ rivals.
Immersing into the political game, even under Maduro’s conditions, means the possibility of surviving and, why not, winning if political wisdom is employed.
III
Will there be a positive ending this time? Predicting it is difficult. This is not the first attempt at negotiations between the government and the opposition. During the Maduro government, the first round took place on April 10, 2014, and the last in Barbados in 2019, without success. The only difference today is the feeling of exhaustion that could have led both the government and the opposition to consider negotiating, helped by a more favorable external environment. But if they get to negotiate, it will be for selfish reasons. The government wants a minimum level of governance so that its permanence in power is less agitated, and the opposition wants to preserve itself as a political alternative. This political selfishness is not a bad thing because it could lead to favorable results in conversations that may have already started.
The climate for negotiations will be tested several times. I will mention the most important of them. The first will be the electoral test. It took place with the appointment of the National Electoral Council, but it remains to be seen how the body will exercise its functions and if it will be different or the same old thing. The appointment was accepted without much enthusiasm, but it was not rejected either.
The second test will be the state and municipal elections. The rules and the agreements between the government and the opposition. For example, the government will have to agree not to appoint parallel regional governments, and the opposition will not turn the states’ governments into territories to oust Maduro.
The third test will be the parties under judicial intervention. I think it will be difficult for the government to accept giving the direction of these parties back to their natural leaders. This is the case of the Supreme Court ruling that gave control over political party Acción Democrática to Bernabé Gutiérrez for one year. It was difficult to reverse this decision because the party now headed by Gutiérrez is part of the system accepted by the government and it decided to take part in the 2020 elections. The government will not dishonor this agreement. It wants to be trustworthy for the organizations that play within the system. How they play or the quality of their actions is another discussion (whether or not they legitimize the regime). So the parties under judicial intervention will have to look for other options or build from scratch and call the public to vote for them on their new platforms to build a political force.
Finally, Rector Picón’s tweet announced that 60% of the state legislators will be elected by party rolls while 40% will be elected under a nominal basis, a change from the previous 70/30 ratio. Although this change comes from the 2020 parliamentary elections, a real advance would be providing information on how these positions will be awarded. On the other hand, if those elected from the nominal precinct are not removed from the party list, we could see a repeat of the 2020 parliamentary elections where the ruling coalition won over 90% of the seats with only 70% of the votes. This can happen again at the state and municipal level if it is not defined how the seats will be allocated. This will be another test.
For the moment, we hear of political negotiations because the two groups accept that coexistence will be conflictive but no side will be able to destroy the other. If there is trust between the two, they could agree on the most relevant test, the 2024 presidential elections or a recall referendum, but it should be by mutual agreement instead of a unilateral decision.
We can expect two scenarios. A repeat of past mistakes or the building up of a step-by-step framework of political interactions that regulates the conflict. Today, we believe that progress is being made in the latter, but it will not be an easy road.
We must remember that we live under an authoritarian form of government. It negotiates because it seeks to stabilize and set up the political game under certain rules, but it does not negotiate because it is considering or envisaging abandoning power. Whether this happens will depend a lot on the quality of the opposition and its strategy. The government will seek to use the opposition as a factor for political stability without discussing the alternation of power. Even under this circumstance, the opposition must go to talks with the government. It does not have the power to make the government discuss alternation but it can promote it by participating in the rules of the system.
The great challenge for the opposition will be how to unblock hegemony and prevent the regularization of the conflict from becoming the regularization of authoritarianism with the government swallowing up the opposition and taming it. Reaching alternation will be very difficult, but I don’t see any other way than to build it from the government’s own rules. The opposition must not only raise the demands it deems necessary but, at the same time, build its strength by participating in elections and life as a whole in Venezuela. Now that “celebrities” and twitter’s wise opinion recognize all this, perhaps the strategy will have better luck this time and the opposition will be able to move towards alternation with more solid steps.
Translated by José Rafael Medina
