“Both chavismo and the opposition must accept that currently there is nothing else than the negotiation table.” This is how Michael Penfold described the situation of the country when consulted by La Gran Aldea, and goes on to say that “holding new parliamentary elections is fundamental and could unlock the whole game because it would allow progressive sanctions relief, not only as a result of the negotiation but from a parliamentary pact.” He also warned Venezuelan society and the leaders of the opposition that “both negotiations and regional elections must be approached under a good dose of realism because what one wishes is not always feasible”

The beginning of a round of dialogue between representatives of the Nicolás Maduro regime and the Venezuelan opposition in Mexico is getting attention, even at the international level. This is a key moment that should be taken advantage of, as observed by Michael Penfold, Global Researcher at the Wilson Center in Washington and Senior Lecturer at IESA in Caracas. In his opinion, the policy change in the United States, which now assumes negotiation as the appropriate solution to the institutional and democratic crisis in Venezuela, has become an outstanding factor, but “if the opposition’s division between the most radical and the moderate wings grows and the regional elections become the bone of contention, I do not predict a good future for this cycle of talks.” He argues that the round of dialogue should be used to address the underlying institutional issues and propose constitutional reforms “that diminish the benefits of being in power”

-What do you expect from this new dialogue that began on August 13 in Mexico?

-The talks are a fundamental step to which the country is arriving late. Even though the process is kicking off with many weaknesses and risks, some factors could help to achieve a different outcome from that of the four previous rounds of dialogue. The most important of them is that the United States has made a very important policy shift and now assumes the negotiation as the appropriate solution to the institutional and democratic crisis in Venezuela. Also, this time the international actors in the Americas, Europe, and Latin America are aligned like never before. When I say that the process has weaknesses, I mean that the two sides are going to the table with many questions regarding the structure of the negotiation.

 It is necessary to strengthen the international front, but if you cannot mobilize the people inside the country and fail to offer something different, nobody will make a connection with you.

Michael Penfold

-What are the criteria to measure the success or failure of this negotiation?

-First, a successful negotiation requires the early convergence of both parties on what the structure of the process will be and yielding prompt and meaningful results to Venezuelans. The second thing is that the two sides should define how the process will advance after the meetings in Mexico, given that conversations will also be held in Caracas there will also be. A clear delimitation of the stages is essential. This means defining how the process is going to be divided. An important point is that if the opposition’s division between the most radical and the moderate wings grows and the regional elections become the bone of contention, I do not predict a good future for this cycle of talks. There is also the risk of thinking that this is a short-term thing. Reaching an agreement could take more than a few weeks or months of conversations. I believe that the people, the ruling chavismo, and the opposition, must accept that at this time there is nothing else than the negotiation table, which in my opinion will be around for a long time.

-Why do you say that we are late for the negotiation?

-Because it should have happened a long time ago. It is clear that this is the only way out for the country at this moment and we have been deferring it. In fact, a part of the opposition came to this process after the more moderate wing began to open an electoral path by pressing for a new board of directors of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and working on the possibility of regional and local elections. I would dare to say that the more radical faction is taking part in the negotiation as a result of the effort of the more moderate wing. There is tension, however, because some sectors believe that attending the negotiations and taking part in the November 21 elections are mutually exclusive possibilities. I believe that both events can be perfectly combined.

-Who makes up the radical wing and the moderate wing that you mention?

– I believe that the radical wing is the one that bet on the use of force as a way out of the crisis, which never came to materialize, while the moderate wing is the one that has always sought a negotiated solution, which includes the electoral path. The radical side leaned very firmly towards the idea of ​​an interim government, while the moderate side holds that this course of action does not necessarily guarantee a process of democratization in Venezuela.

-And what is your take?

-I consider that the wing that focused all its attention on international pressure and bet on the interim government to fracture the ruling coalition failed. Right now, we have to deal with what we have, the opposition must heal its wounds and coordinate again. Entering into this negotiation with internal divisions will benefit the ruling Chavismo, whose main objective is to take advantage of the process to further divide its opponents and normalize the current situation with (the presidential elections of) 2024 in mind. I think that the democratic leaders must stay together and focus, fundamentally, on achieving an institutional agreement that allows elections to renew and legitimize all public powers.

A successful negotiation requires the early convergence of both parties on what the structure of the process will be and yielding prompt and meaningful results to Venezuelans.

Michael Penfold

-What elements does the opposition have to show up at a negotiation given the weakness and lack of unity that you described?

-There is tension within the opposition but this is not an insurmountable problem, and I believe that the negotiation is an opportunity to harmonize different views. The discussion in Mexico cannot revolve exclusively on the electoral guarantees and a roadmap for elections. It must also address, above all, the underlying institutional issues and propose constitutional reforms that reduce the benefits of being in power and allow the opposition to lead a democratic and political life.

-What are these constitutional reforms?

-The first of them must be the repeal of indefinite reelection and the guarantee of democratic alternation, as established in the 1999 Constitution; and secondly, the country requires a legal instrument that shields the division of powers and allows their renewal, so that the rights of Venezuelans are fully restored. On the other hand, fiscal federalism must be guaranteed, so that mayors and governors can fulfill their mandates without being undermined by “protectorates” (parallel regional authorities appointed by the central government) or communal councils that take on competencies that they do not have. These institutional issues are essential; even after an electoral agreement, we will continue to be trapped in a democratic crisis if we fail to modify the political system so that losing an election does not mean a tragedy and winning does not become a mechanism to perpetuate in power.

-When you speak of 2024, do you mean that there will be no presidential election before that year?

–Nothing is for sure, but it is evident that Nicolás Maduro prefers to hold elections for president in 2024, for parliament in 2025, and get rid of the recall referendum. This is his objective and that is why the government is going to try to encourage an opposition that does not question that possibility. On the other hand, the opposition has set its core objective in Mexico in setting an electoral roadmap that allows the renewal of all public powers and, in some way, guarantees the celebration of elections with some degree of international recognition.

-Does the opposition have the power to force Chavismo to accept the renewal or re-legitimation of powers?

-That can be worked out through two topics: international sanctions and offering guarantees for everyone. I insist that the opposition will have a bad time in Mexico if it only seeks to negotiate elections because it does not have the power to impose them. But if it proposes a substantive institutional change where Chavismo is given the assurance that it will be able to lead a political life even after losing elections, I think it is possible to achieve a serious electoral roadmap. I believe that holding a new legislative election is fundamental and could unlock the whole game because it would allow progressive sanctions relief, not only as a result of the negotiation but from a parliamentary pact. There are many options, but if the sides are unwilling to explore them, the process risks coming to an abrupt end.

Evading the regional and local elections (…) is absurd. These elections are a first step to activate and organize the opposition’s party structures, which are severely weakened.

Michael Penfold

-What role do the regional and local elections play in the negotiation process?

-The opposition goes to Mexico with a much lower bargaining power than it had two years ago, and the fact of sitting at the table does give it no more. Evading the regional and local elections simply under the idea they will legitimize Maduro is absurd. These elections are a first step to activate and organize the opposition’s party structures, which are severely weakened. I think that we must open that space, in the understanding that these elections do not guarantee a return to democracy by themselves, but constitute an important step in the efforts of recent months. Are we going to win the elections? Well, I don’t know. If the opposition participates as a single bloc, it may win states such as Zulia, Táchira, or even Miranda or Aragua, as it did in 2008. That would be a turning point.

-How can the opposition explain to a part of the population that participating in regional and local elections does not legitimize the Maduro regime?

-By showing that the reason is strictly political and that there is no other option because the alternative they tried to advance has failed. Both the negotiations and regional elections must be approached under a good dose of realism because what one wishes is not always feasible. The opposition often works on wishes rather than facts.

–And if that’s the case, why didn’t we go to the last parliamentary elections, which were much more important?

-Because there was no agreement on the participation of Europe in monitoring the process, which makes a big difference, but it is very clear that the opposition must reach out to the people and connect with them again, and the upcoming regional and local elections could be an opportunity or are we going to repeat what we did in Zulia, where we won and later decided to give up? That was a big mistake.

-Do you think that the strategy of the four governors of Acción Democrática, who accepted to be sworn in before the Constituent Assembly, was more successful?

-I think that an opposition that is strengthened from the inside rather than placing all its bets on the outside is more successful. It is necessary to strengthen the international front, but if you cannot mobilize the people inside the country and fail to offer something different, nobody will make a connection with you. At this time, the opposition parties as a whole have approval ratings of no more than 12%; In other words, there is a major crisis of political representation in the country.

When was the breaking point of the interim government?

-When Juan Guaidó began to try to create the idea of an interim government instead of acting as a president of the National Assembly who is also an interim president. I think that was a turning point because they were convinced that the move was going to fracture the ruling coalition and failed to create the incentives to bring about change, at times when it became evident that the interim government and the international pressure alone were not enough.

– Could the involvement of Russia and the United States end up imposing an agreement above the interests of both the opposition and Chavismo?

-If recent experience has taught us something, it is that the national or international issue does not guarantee anything by itself. We are talking about a combination of being able to align the external factors, which are well positioned at the moment, with the internal ones, which are not. The task of all the actors of the country is to strengthen that process because it is the only thing we have. If it fails, I think the United States, Europe, the Russians, and the Chinese are going to give up. Imploding the Mexico negotiations would mean preserving a status quo in which Maduro can continue to cling to power as he has done so far. I want to believe that the facilitation of the United States, Europe, and even Russia will make us move toward a different ending than in the previous dialogues.

Translated by José Rafael Medina