That Monday, when the quarantined Venezuelans woke up to a suspended service of DirecTV, the main entertainment for 11 million of us, a message went viral through hectic WhatsApp forums. I tweeted that my mother, a woman in her seventies, had called grieving the sudden absence of someone she considered a member of the family. Several well-intentioned people sent me a private message which, like a lifeboat in the Titanic, ensured that if the DirecTV decoder was unplugged for 5 minutes, reconnected, and reset “you will get signal again and every TV channel except for local stations”. My witty friend Luis Francisco Cabezas replied to one of the messages in the chat: “I’m sorry, but that is as effective as saying a prayer to the decoder. A decision was made and it is now in progress.” Naivety aside, the longing reminded me of magical voluntarism, that particular culture cemented in Venezuela as a consequence of the oil boom consisting in the expectation of seeing things solve by themselves without much effort from us other than wishing it with frenzy

An example of magical voluntarism can be found in the strategy of “the greatest possible pressure” promoted by a faction within the opposition that hopes the Coronavirus does what they have not been able to do. To discuss this, we will refer to the article “Gasoline and the Failed State in Venezuela”, published by Interim Government Attorney General, José Ignacio Hernández, on “La gran aldea” website.

The purpose of the text is to debate with those who have raised, amid the Coronavirus emergency, the need for a humanitarian agreement between the authorities to promote the best possible response to the impact of the pandemic. To elaborate his argument, the attorney in exile orbits around Nicolás Maduro’s decision to import gasoline from Iran. In the first part, he describes the causes of fuel shortages, the destruction of the oil industry in particular, and the entire economy in general, by the Bolivarian model of domination. The only thing I would add is the dismissal of 18,000 oil workers at the end of 2002, a technical capacity loss that could never be fully replaced. Next, the text breaks down the gasoline sales business for what it correctly classifies as informal and illegal channels, leading the author to the conclusion that “in reality, gasoline is imported so that the informal and illegal organizations holding the de facto control of the distribution can continue generating income”. The fourth paragraph brings us closer to the heart of the rationale: It would be a mistake to think that “the fuel problem” requires a humanitarian pact, which in his opinion is reduced to the lifting of financial sanctions against the country: “If the sanctions were lifted today, Venezuela would continue to be a fragile state undermined by kleptocracy and organized crime.” The author proposes to create “a national emergency government centered on the Council of State”, given that “it is not possible to think of importing gasoline or food while Maduro and his cronies are at the forefront of the distribution of these goods”. The core is left for the end of the text: “The solution to the Venezuelan crisis is not easy, nor does it go through temporary and limited relief only. Proposing palliative measures as a solution is a serious distortion of reality. And that reality is that only the departure of the Maduro regime can allow progress on the long and winding road to Venezuela’s recovery. Without it, Venezuela will not survive, no matter how much gasoline is imported.”

Since the author was so generous in chronicling the situation of the national oil industry, one could ask why there was no similar explanation of how “a national emergency government centered on the Council of State” would be achieved, under the current circumstances of fragmentation, weakness of the democratic field, and the impossibility of collective action. Distrustful readers already affirm that the empty dogma “cessation of usurpation” is being replaced by “national emergency government”. In my opinion, Hernández is waiting for the Venezuelan decoder to reboot and get signal after 5 minutes of unplugging, with every channel except for “Maduro and his cronies”. In response to minimalism, or solving the needs of the population today, Hernández answers with maximalism.

In the “Democratic transition framework for Venezuela”, the US State Department established as part of the guarantees that “the military high command (Minister of Popular Power for Defense, the Deputy Minister of Defense, the chief of the Strategic Command Operation, and the other commanders) will remain in charge during the transitional government. Isn’t this same High Command accused of the country’s licit and illicit businesses, including the smuggling of gasoline? Isn’t this what the Attorney’s concerns point to? Or perhaps they point to the fact that it would not be convenient for the “greatest possible pressure” that Venezuelans had access, despite long queues, to 5 gallons of gas to cover their most urgent needs?

At the beginning of his dissertation, Hernández interrogates: “the coronavirus pandemic represents a high risk for weakened civil society. Does it make sense to keep sanctions in force amid this crisis? ” He then tells us that this is a minor question, almost trivial since the important interrogation we should ask ourselves if we are rational beings is: “what is the effective cause preventing the Venezuelan State from addressing the emergency”, or more specifically, “what is the cause affecting fuel supply in Venezuela ”. Such a statement can only be made, as is the case, by someone who lives abroad and does not suffer the real and concrete consequences of a Complex Humanitarian Emergency now under a pandemic.

From what we know so far, the idea of ​​“a national emergency government” is a wish, part of a political strategy uncorrelated with the reality of social work. Hope for the Complex Humanitarian Emergency to worsen or Coronavirus to achieve by itself, and without much effort, the reset of the decoder, the necessary blow to make political change feasible. Magical voluntarism at its best. The problem is not only that this idea instrumentalizes the suffering of Venezuelans, but neglects the moral principles that should belong to the democratic field and not to the dictatorship: Placing the well-being of the population above all other considerations at a time of a health catastrophe that has caused over 349,000 deaths worldwide in a few months, in countries that had a far more robust and reliable health system than ours.

Finally, a paragraph to prevent easy criticism. It is impossible to have the same level of responsibility as a government that has established a dictatorship, forcibly expelled more than 4 million Venezuelans from the country, killed more than 400 people in demonstrations, and murdered 23 people by torture in 2019 alone. That said, I add: It is a pity that the strategy of “the greatest possible pressure” ends up considering the Coronavirus not as an epidemic, but as an opportunity for the conquest of power without real political work on the streets, outside social media, for the inclusion of the majority in a narrative that revives hope and exorcises mistrust, without waiting passively, with a prayer, for the reset of the decoder.

Translated by: José Rafael Medina.