CIVICUS spoke with Rafael Uzcátegui, Coordinator-General at the Venezuelan Education-Action Program on Human Rights (Provea), about the results of the recent opposition primaries in the face of the 2024 presidential elections.

Provea is a civil society organization in Venezuela dedicated to educating the most vulnerable sectors about their rights and providing legal support to victims of human rights violations.

What is the opposition’s strategy in the face of the 2024 elections?

The opposition’s strategy consists of promoting a unitary nomination, supported by the majority of the opposition, to face President Nicolás Maduro in the next elections. It may look easy, but this is a major challenge in the current conditions. After the failure of the maximum pressure strategy, which had its apex in the 2017 protests and the interim Government of Juan Guaidó in early 2019, tensions and distrust arose and the opposition fragmented. Citizens lost confidence in their leaders. According to polls conducted towards the end of the pandemic, Guaidó’s approval ratings were as low as Maduro’s. More than 80% of citizens did not like either of them.

This revealed a crisis of representation that affected both the government and the opposition. Adopting a new strategy became a necessity, but the move was not sufficiently explained to the citizens. Nor was there a public assessment of the mistakes made by the traditional opposition leadership, leading to widespread distrust and hopelessness among citizens. The feeling that there was nothing left to do was so profound that some analysts and political leaders suggested that we wait for the 2030 elections instead of the 2024 process.

However, things have changed in the course of one year. The opposition primary election served to legitimize a unitary candidacy through popular consultation. At first, the process seemed like a simple bureaucratic procedure, but as the date approached a political event that exceeded the expectations of its promoters gained traction. Even though the elections were carried out under complete censorship, physical attacks against the candidates during their campaign, limited resources and veiled or explicit threats from the authorities that sought to discourage people from participating, more than two million voters turned up to the polls.

This not only showed a great longing for change but also the restoration of the belief within the democratic society that change is possible. The event consolidated the electoral strategy as the path to follow and fostered a grassroots consensus on a potential unitary candidacy and a new leadership within the opposition.

The return to democracy has two key variables: the construction of agreements in the opposition and the recovery of citizens’ trust in democratic leadership. The opposition primaries were an important first step in that direction. If further steps are taken in the same direction, the opposition might once again constitute a credible threat to the authoritarian regime.

What was the government’s reaction to the opposition primaries?

The government underestimated the effects of the primaries by believing that censorship, misinformation and harassment would discourage people from participating, but the high turnout was the first big surprise. It became evident that many people still believe that voting is a safe mechanism to express their opinions. The second surprise was the overwhelming support for candidate María Corina Machado across the country and among all social sectors that took part in the vote.

Machado had been criticized under the argument that her message catered only to the middle and wealthier sectors, but the support she received reflects a generalized aspiration for better living conditions. Machado even garnered the support of the voters most loyal to the ruling party, which in part explained the desperate response of trying to invalidate the elections through judicial means.

The Supreme Court of Justice has ordered the “suspension” of the effects of the opposition primary election on the grounds of fraud. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a mechanism of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, described the Court as a part of a machinery to criminalize dissent.

At the same time and in an attempt to divert attention, the government has sought to exacerbate a nationalist sentiment by reactivating a controversy over the territory of Guayana Esequiba -disputed by Venezuela but under the control of Guyana- and calling for a consultative referendum on the matter on December 3.

Will Machado be able to run in the 2024 elections or will the government seek to ban her nomination?

The authorization of Machado’s candidacy, as well as the following of the other recommendations of the Electoral Observation Mission of the European Union (EU) for the celebration of elections under democratic guarantees, will be a great challenge. Now is the time to fight the authorities’ tactic of disqualifying any political leader popular enough to win key positions through elections.

The existence of adequate conditions for the exercise of the rights to freedom of assembly and participation will depend on several factors that must operate simultaneously: the strengthening of the democratic camp, dialogue between the government and the opposition, the recovery of citizen trust and pressure from the international community.

The road toward 2024 is long. If Machado ends up being barred from running, the opposition should establish a mechanism for reaching a consensus on an alternative candidate, with her having an important role. It should be clearly established and held that the strategy for a democratic transition necessarily involves the holding of elections.

What are the real possibilities of achieving democratic alternation?

The principle of democratic alternation is completely strange to Chavismo. The movement came to power to remain in power forever and considers that its “revolutionary” conception of the world is the only true and necessary approach to improving the living conditions of the population. As is the case in Cuba or Nicaragua, the government needs to hold elections -even if they are nothing more than a simulation- for several reasons, including the need to obtain a certain degree of legitimacy in the international community. As the line between a simulation and a farce is very thin, the elections must be organized in a way that makes them appear genuine.

A positive factor is that Venezuela is currently under investigation by the International Criminal Court and under scrutiny by mechanisms such as the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission. This scrutiny is a deterrent to open and widespread repression. These are gaps that the democratic camp can use to ensure greater democratic guarantees in the next elections.

In the coming months, we will witness a show of force between the government and the opposition. A negative message we are receiving from different international actors is that the 2024 elections will be a milestone in the normalization of relations with Venezuela, regardless of how they are organized. I think that Maduro is not willing to organize elections that he could lose, and he will make many efforts to divide and discourage a vote against him.

To overcome these obstacles, it will be necessary to maintain the synergy between a cohesive political leadership, a citizenry highly motivated to participate and pressure from the international community, especially from the progressive sectors of the region, to prevent the most radical sectors of Chavismo and the Armed Forces hinder a potential transition. It is important to offer guarantees to the most democratic sectors of Chavismo so that they can reintegrate into the transition. Ultimately, it is about establishing the correct incentives so that the cost of exit is lower than the cost of remaining in power by any means.

How is civil society working to ensure the transparency and competitiveness of the electoral process?

Human rights organizations have endorsed the seven key recommendations of the report of the EU Electoral Observation Mission: the enhancement of the separation of powers; the elimination of political disqualifications; the conduction of a voter education campaign; the establishment of sanctions for electoral offenses; balanced media coverage; the repeal of the so-called “anti-hate law” to avoid self-censorship and promote freedom of expression, and introduce a combination of incentives and sanction measures to increase the presence of trained and accredited polling staff on election day.

Civil society organizations in the field of electoral rights are leading the advocacy efforts in this regard, with the support of the rest of the organizations. On October 17, the government and the opposition signed the “Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All,” known as the Barbados Agreement.

The government should honor this agreement; however, it has already shown signs of not having the intention to do so. By initiating a judicial process against the opposition primary elections, it has failed to comply with the first point of the agreement establishing that each political sector is free to select their candidate for the elections.

What should the international community do to help Venezuela have free and competitive elections in 2024?

There is no way to achieve a transition to democracy in Venezuela without the support and pressure of the international community. For now, the United States has taken the initiative by stimulating the Barbados Agreement and establishing a mechanism for the lifting of financial sanctions.

However, both the sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations and the arms embargo should stay in force. International initiatives to monitor and protect human rights in Venezuela must also remain active. The government is operating to prevent the extension of the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission, which the UN Human Rights Council is due to decide on in 2024. This is the most important fact-finding mechanism we have, whose work complements the efforts of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Finally, it is important that the progressive governments of Latin America, such as Brazil, Chile and Colombia, convey public and private messages to the Venezuelan authorities so that they agree to hold elections with democratic guarantees.

Translated by Jose Rafael Medina